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Why [some philosophers think] using animals in scientific research is seriously wrong[1]

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Introduction

My aim is to explain to you why some philosophers think using animals in scientific research is wrong - even when the research concerned produces substantial benefits for humans or other animals, and even if the procedures involved are humane. Their argument is straightforward: it would be wrong to use non-consenting human beings as experimental subjects in such research. Given that human and nonhuman animals have comparable psychological and physiological capacities, then it must also be wrong to use nonhuman animals. It is just arbitrary discrimination to think it is wrong to use non-consenting human beings but right to use nonhuman animals.

According to the American philosopher Tom Regan when an individual is used to produce benefits for others they are necessarily harmed in the process, irrespective of whether they experience pain or suffering, or are subsequently killed (Regan 1983 page 388). Pain and suffering and death compound the wrongness of using individuals in research but these forms of harm are in addition, or secondary, to the primary form of harm. The primary form of harm consists in simply being viewed as an appropriate research tool - something whose wellbeing or welfare, value and existence is considered derivative of one's usefulness for the research concerned. Thus, for Regan, we can understand the key ethical question as, 'is the experimental subject being treated in ways which suggest its well-being or welfare, value and existence are less important than the goals of the research?'

In the interests of stimulating debate I will defend this position by way of presenting a basic or 'generic'

1 .The first three articles in the last edition of ANZCCART NEWS (Vol. 17.3, 2004) were of a "technical" nature. They dealt with issues including the induction of anaesthesia and euthanasia, and animal consciousness. In contrast, we commence this edition of the newsletter with a trio of related articles that deal with the concept of "animal rights". The first two articles represent talks presented by John Hadley and Siobhan O'Sullivan, as part of an introductory course for new researchers at the University of Sydney. Having read these articles, the editor asked Malcolm France, who organised the course, to write a "rejoinder" article. Malcolm kindly agreed to do so. It is suggested that the three articles be read as a group – Editor.

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Note from the Editor

ANZCCART NEWS provides a forum for one of ANZCCART's most important roles—the fostering of discussion and debate on issues related to the use of animals in research and teaching. Published articles cover a spectrum of opinion. ANZCCART wishes to make it abundantly clear that the views expressed by contributors are not necessarily those held by ANZCCART.

argument for animal rights. While some animal rights philosophers may disagree with specific aspects of the argument as I cast it, it is safe to say that most would endorse at least the first three premises (see, for example, Pluhar 1995 page 20; Regan 2004 page 50; Rachels 1990 page 181; Rollins 1992 page 30; Rowlands 2002 page 47; Singer 1995 page 3).

I will try to avoid philosophical jargon as much as possible but there is one distinction that I would like to make plain at the outset. This is the distinction philosophers make between, on the one hand, the 'descriptive' or how the world is (or what people actually do), and on the other, the 'normative' or how the world should be (or what people ought to do). This distinction is sometimes referred to as the difference between facts and values. Scientists are primarily concerned with discovering empirical facts and confirming hypotheses about them. Moral philosophers, in contrast, are concerned with normative values and whether particular practices conform to ethical standards designed to promote or honour these values.

This difference in emphasis between scientists and philosophers is important because it explains why for some moral philosophers the bare fact that a practice is widespread says nothing *in itself* about its moral legitimacy. For example, the fact that slavery was widespread and accepted throughout various times in history does not prove that it was justified then or now. Similarly, the fact that using animals in research may have widespread public support is not sufficient to justify the *Australian Code of Practice*. Of course, the fact that a practice is widespread may be an indicator of its permissibility – society may have got the ethics right and the practice may be justified – but the point is that the mere fact that a practice is entrenched does not *in itself* make it morally legitimate. For philosophers, to determine whether a practice is morally legitimate we need to subject it to critical thinking, just as a scientist may apply an investigative method to test a hypothesis.

The critical thinking method that philosophers employ to investigate the morality of existing practices may strike some people as a little suspicious. In seeking to determine whether a given practice is ethically justified philosophers often employ 'thought experiments' – exercises in thinking which focus on hypothetical or counter-factual situations. There is nothing mysterious about such methods of critical thinking. As long as it is accepted that there is a meaningful distinction between facts and values, and that scientists in pursuit of knowledge have at least some ethical constraints upon them, then engaging in thought experiments can be understood as just a philosopher's way of testing a hypothesis in accordance with an investigative method analogous to that employed by researchers. Scientists test ideas by empirical observation; philosophers test ideas by critically thinking about them.

The basic argument for animal rights:

1. It is a basic principle of justice to 'treat like cases alike.'

2. All sentient animals with an experiential welfare (human and nonhuman) are *sufficiently similar in morally relevant respects* to be intelligibly and non-arbitrarily considered 'like cases.'

3. *Conclusion:* All sentient animals with an experiential welfare (human and nonhuman) are entitled to *comparable* treatment.

4. It would be wrong to use non-consenting human beings in scientific research even if doing so produces substantial benefits for others.

If (3) and given (4)

5. *Conclusion*: it is wrong to use nonhuman animals in scientific research even if doing so produces substantial benefits for others.

Premise one: Treating like cases alike

Let us look at the first premise of the basic animal rights argument that is a normative argument, and thus its premises make claims about how things should be. It may come as a surprise to many of you that the first premise makes a normative claim that just about everyone accepts as legitimate, even I suggest scientists who may be suspicious of values

and concerned only with finding facts.

As I understand it, all of you attending this presentation are research postgraduates or honours students who have recently being admitted into the research programs of your respective faculties or departments. I assume all of you were required to submit an application as part of the admission process. In this application you would have made a proposal in which you sought to justify your inclusion into the particular research program. No doubt it was your expectation that your prospective candidature would be assessed on its merits in accordance with some kind of impartial procedure deemed to be at least reasonably fair, and open to all other graduates in a relevantly similar position to your own. Presumably, if in the event that two candidates had applications equal in all relevant respects, the expectation is that some non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory procedure would be applied for choosing one candidate over the other, say, flipping a coin or comparing the weighted mean of undergraduate marks. To favour a candidate on some arbitrary or irrelevant grounds such as their height, eye colour or race would clearly be regarded by all concerned as unjust.

The point of the 'application form example' is to stress that a normative principle intended to ensure a degree of impartiality and fairness, along the lines of – 'all cases that are relevantly similar should be treated the same' - is a basic norm that just about everyone accepts as appropriate for regulating behaviour in many aspects of our lives - job or scholarship applications, legal procedures, even regulating ordinary conventions such as queuing in supermarket check-out lines or at taxi ranks. No one would say it was fair to send someone to the end of the line in the supermarket because they were wearing a yellow shirt or because they had dark skin. It is a principle reflecting such a basic norm that constitutes the first premise of the animal rights argument. Given that just about everyone accepts the principle of 'treating like cases alike,' it is not surprising that many people's response to the basic argument for animal rights is that it is much stronger than they had initially believed (e.g. Law 2003 page 240). As the Professor of Philosophy and Physiology at Colorado State University Bernard Rollin said "introducing people to animal rights is simply reminding them about what they already believe" (Rollin 1992 page 25).

Premise two: All animals (human and nonhuman) are 'like cases'

The second premise of the animal rights argument, however, is not as widely accepted as the first, even though it also appeals to widely held norms. The second premise makes the normative claim that human and nonhuman animals are *sufficiently similar in morally relevant respects* to be considered 'like cases.' Like us, nonhuman animals have an interest in avoiding pain and suffering, and in experiencing pleasure and preference satisfaction. Like newborn infants, nonhuman animals have an interest in continuing to live, even though they may not have any future-orientated projects or plans, or even any concept of the future. In other words, once we strip away all the obvious differences between humans and other animals that don't seem relevant to questions of basic justice, then nonhuman animals are just like us - *psychological beings with lives that can go well or ill for them* (Frey 2003 page 362).

Defence of premise two

Some philosophers, however, regard the claim that human and nonhuman animals are 'like cases' as outrageous, and a sign of moral decadence (Carruthers, 1992: xi). But is premise two of the animal rights argument really making an outrageous claim? Note that the premise states not that human and nonhuman animals are *identical*, but the modest claim that they are 'sufficiently similar.' And note also that the argument is that nonhuman animals are entitled to *comparable* treatment not 'identical' treatment.

No animal rights philosopher is suggesting that nonhuman animals should have a right to vote, anymore than they would demand such a right for a child or the right to abortion for a man. Neither do they deny that humans are generally more intelligent and rational than other animals and that this fact is important when determining how individuals should be treated or how valuable their lives are. Instead, implicit in premise two is the idea that the obvious differences between humans and animals, such as intelligence or rationality, are not so great as to justify a radical discrepancy in how they are treated. The differences are ones only of degree, not of kind (Monamy 2000 page 41). This is surely not an outrageous idea but one we are all familiar with. We don't permit less intelligent human beings to be treated

inhumanely while insisting upon humane treatment for geniuses. Humans have the same basic rights not to be harmed or unnecessarily killed irrespective of their differences in intellectual capacities.

Think of the claim that all animals are 'like cases' as akin to having two successful applications for admission into a postgraduate or honours program even though the applicants may not be of identical merit. The fact that one candidate may have a stronger application than another, does not imply that the second candidate is not also still qualified, and thus eligible for all the privileges associated with membership of the program.

Objection and replies

The philosophers who claim that the call for animal rights is a sign of moral decadence reject premise two of the argument by insisting that humans and other animals are not equally qualified. They claim to the effect that there would be something special about the application of a post-graduate research candidate that is a human being that sets them apart, and *this fact alone* also serves to show that humans and nonhuman animals are not 'like cases.'

But should the bare fact that a candidate is a human being be all that significant? Is species membership alone a morally relevant difference between human and nonhuman animals? If there was an intelligent alien just like all of you in all relevant respects, able to meet all the requirements expected of a postgraduate researcher but lacking our DNA, would it be fair to reject their application into the research program *simply because they lacked your DNA*? Wouldn't DNA in such a case be as irrelevant as height or eye colour or gender in a supermarket queue? What about if the applicant was a person of the extinct species *Homo flores* evidence of which was recently found in Indonesia? It makes sense to call them 'persons,' even though they were not *Homo sapiens* because, as far as anyone can tell, they were sufficiently similar though not identical to us.

Animal rights philosophers defend premise two by arguing that it is not *simply being human* that makes a life valuable or determines how an individual is to be treated, but rather the psychological capacities of the individual concerned. Judging by practices such as primate research, human embryonic stem-cell research, abortion and voluntary euthanasia this is a view widely shared by many in the medical and scientific community, except perhaps by those who subscribe to views associated with Christianity.

On the Christian view, those who support embryonic stem-cell research, abortion and voluntary euthanasia are implicitly endorsing the basic claim of the animal rights movement - that the value of life ought not to be grounded in species membership but rather in psychological capacities. But, should we consider all human life as valuable as Christian teaching enjoins us to believe? Would we say that people in permanently vegetative states or irreversible comas have valuable lives? Would we say the life of a zygote or a 4 week-old fetus is valuable simply because it is a *Homo sapien*? To believe that all human life is valuable, irrespective of the psychological capacities attendant upon it, is to be committed to the view that irreversible coma patients and zygotes have valuable lives worth preserving. The implication of such a view is that turning off life support systems and using surplus IVF embryos in stem-cell research is seriously wrong. There may be a good reason for keeping coma patients alive indefinitely and for sparing the lives of zygotes, but it is surely not simply because they are *Homo sapiens*.

Thinking about cases like the intelligent alien, the *Homo flores*, people in comas, zygotes, human embryonic stem-cell and primate research would suggest that merely being human is not what determines how beings should be treated; instead, it is the psychological life of a being that seems to ground its moral importance. If this is true then it would seem that species membership alone should not be cited as a morally relevant difference between humans and other animals.

Premise four

I said at the outset that my goal was to explain why some philosophers think using animals in scientific research is wrong, even if the benefits for humans and other animals were substantial. In order to finish what I set out to do, the argument needs an additional

premise to the effect that the utilitarian principle of 'the ends justify the means' or 'doing bad in the name of good' is unacceptable as a moral norm.

We can evaluate the utilitarian principle by asking whether it would justify using non-consenting human beings in scientific research that produced substantial benefits for other human beings. If it does not justify using non-consenting human beings as experimental subjects, then I have completed the task I set out to do, because a logical consequence of premise three of the animal rights argument, and the unacceptability of the utilitarian principle, is that it is wrong to use animals in scientific research even if doing so produced substantial benefits for others. Recall that for animal rights philosophers humans and animals are 'like cases' entitled to comparable treatment; so if it is wrong to do bad to humans in the name of good, then it is wrong to do bad to animals in the name of good.

So is it wrong to do bad to non-consenting human beings in the name of good? Utilitarian philosophers think the answer depends upon how bad the bad is and how great the good is. And indeed reasoning along these lines is presumably meant to inform the decision making of ethics committees. At some point in the research approval process the projected results are weighed against the expected impact on the experimental subjects concerned (Monamy, 2000 page 69; see also NHMRC, 2004 page 5; 2003 page 16). But note: one cannot even begin to engage in cost-benefit analysis without first assuming that it is permissible to use the experimental subjects in the first place. The utilitarian formula cannot be applied without first assuming that there is no moral impediment or obstacle that prohibits trading-off harms against the few to get benefits for the many. It is making an assumption like this that some philosophers believe best explains why using non-consenting human beings and animals in scientific research is seriously wrong.

Some medical researchers argue that the data obtained from experiments performed by the Nazis during WWII can have a useful scientific application. One researcher, Dr. Robert Pozos from San Diego State University, argues that the Nazi hypothermia experiments conducted at Dachau concentration camp yielded invaluable data about the rewarming of individuals whose body temperatures had fallen below 36 degrees (Pozos, 1992, page 104). Putting aside any question about whether data from Nazi experiments is scientifically reliable or valid; it is possible to ask 'what if the data obtained by the Nazis forcibly immersing people in tanks of ice water for hours at a time was reliable or valid?' 'What if the Nazis developed a method of rewarming human beings which ensured that every single human being who suffered life threatening hypothermia was saved?' Would we want to alter the ethical judgment that what the Nazi's did was wrong? It is important to be clear about what is at issue here. If the utilitarian principle - 'the ends justify the means' - is to be the moral norm to govern scientific research, then it is not obvious that what the Nazis did was wrong. It is only wrong, side effects apart, if no substantial benefit ever comes from the research.

An alternative to the utilitarian approach is to suggest that the wrongness of the Nazi experiments does not hinge on whether the data obtained is reliable or whether the experiments produced substantial human benefit. Instead, the wrongness turns on what was done to the 300 victims (90 of whom died) and the presumption that they were suitable experimental subjects to begin with. If the Nazis had taken steps to ameliorate the pain and suffering of the individuals concerned this may lead us to conclude that some of the actions they undertook in the course of the research were humane, but it would not alter the judgment that using non-consenting human beings as experimental subjects is wrong. This is because the pain relief would have been administered not out of an overriding concern for the victims themselves but in order to make the experiment more humane.

If the researchers concerned viewed the victims themselves as the overriding concern or the "the essential factor" then the pain relief would not have been needed at all because the experiment would never have been performed. The Nazi experiments and other cases of using non-consenting human beings as experimental subjects, such as the US Public Health Service Tuskegee syphilis study (See Regan 2004 page, 38) demonstrate the unacceptability of the 'ends justify the means' justification of scientific research that produces substantial human benefit. At least, that is what some animal rights philosophers think.

Conclusion

The basic argument for animal rights poses a challenge for all researchers who take reasoned argument

seriously. The challenge is to undermine premise 2 by identifying a morally relevant distinction between humans and other animals that can serve as justification for the current double standard between humans and animals as research subjects. This has proved a difficult challenge for many who have so far tried.

In the late 1980's the British Council of Medical Ethics appointed a working party comprising of scientists, veterinarians, philosophers and animal welfare representatives to review contemporary philosophical and moral debate about animal experimentation. The committee reported that a justifiable moral defence of the double standard was unlikely to be found (Monamy 2000 page, 54). In 2003 R.G. Frey the leading philosophical opponent of animal rights (and long time supporter of animal research) said " The problem is that if we cannot separate fully, in a morally significant way, the human and animal cases, then we must either endorse some version of animal research on humans or cease, whether in an immediate or progressive fashion, research on animals. In this sense, the sense in which the argument for animal rights looms large, the case against using animals in research, as I have always maintained, is stronger than most people allow (Frey 2003: 172)."

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Introduction to the Politics of Animal Protection*

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In this presentation, I am going to build on the ideas introduceed by John Hadley in his accompanying paper by discussing the issue of animal rights in practice.

John has spoken to you from a philosophical perspective. He has provided you with an outline explaining why some moral philosophers argue that animals have moral rights.

I am a political scientist, which means I am interested in how power is exercised in complex societies. Political scientists study political institutions such as political parties and parliament. But the discipline of political science is also interested in social movements - that is, how groups of like-minded people come together to advocate a particular view of the world and how those groups seek to influence political outcomes. They may do this by working towards a change in government policy on a particular issue or change to a particular piece of legislation relevant to their cause.

When we think of animal rights we often think of animal rights activists. Animal rights activists are not simply people who hold the private view that animals have moral rights. Rather, animal rights activists are people who

actively seek to influence how the law understands animals and how animals may be used by humans in our society.

However, as I will explain, when people active on animal rights issues espouse an animal rights philosophy, or claim to support animal rights, often they do not have a comprehensive understanding of the philosophical animal rights position. And indeed they are also unlikely to actually subscribe to a true animal rights worldview, as has just been presented to you by John Hadley.

Part of the reason for this discrepancy is simple semantics and I will explain what I mean by that in a moment. However, the fact that there is a discrepancy between the scholarly academic understanding of animal rights, and the view held by the average person at an animal rights protest, is in part a reflection of the manner in which the animal rights movement developed.

There are many different theories about how social change is achieved. But in the case of many social movements what happens is that an injustice, usually against someone or something in a vulnerable position, is identified, and those who are morally opposed to the perceived injustice mobilise in order to bring about justice for the marginalised group. So for example, at the moment in this country there is a rather strong social movement advocating change to the way in which Australia deals with people who arrive in Australia claiming asylum without documentation. It has been argued by some that Australia's system of mandatory detention is immoral, some even say cruel, and some who hold that view strongly have been working to harness the opinion of those who share that view to some extent, in order to bring about change in government policy on that issue.

In the case of animal protection however, the movement has not always developed in that way. It has tended to be academics, especially moral philosophers, who have provided the theoretical framework upon which the movement is built. What you tend to find in the case of a social movement where the scholarly discussion of an issue precedes the actual on the ground political mobilisation, is a gap exists between the scholarly understanding of particular terms and issues, and the popular understanding of those same issues.

For example, Tom Regan, who wrote the scholarly argument in favour of moral rights for animals (Regan 1983), is employed full-time as a moral philosopher. That is his profession. Equally John Hadley, who has explained the philosophy of animal rights to us today, is engaged full-time as a philosopher. However, the people who actually attend 'animal rights' protests are nurses and teachers and accountants and hairdressers. They feel passionately within themselves that the manner in which animals are treated, including by animal researchers, is morally wrong, but they may not be able to comprehensively and consistently articulate why they believe it is wrong. Indeed, it may even be that although they hold a very sincere opposition to animal cruelty, their rationale for opposing what they understand to be animal cruelty isn't actually based on the scholarly animal rights philosophy.

What I would like to do briefly is give you a short introduction to the structure of the modern animal protection movement in Australia. You will note I used the term 'animal protection' as opposed to 'animal rights'. In 1996, US animal rights legal theorist Gary Francione published an influential book titled *Rain without Thunder*, in which he argued persuasively that the expression 'animal rights' does not adequately reflect the range of views held by activists trying to achieve change on animal issues (Francione 1996). Given that, 'animal protection' is the most correct expression to use when talking about people who actively advocate, or carry out welfare work, on behalf of animals. It is a good term to use because it recognises that the animal rights position is a particular moral philosophy and it acknowledges the fact that there is a range of different views held within the animal movement.

Although there are many shades of grey in between it is possible to identify three dominant attitudes within the animal protection movement. They are:

- Animal welfare(ism)
- Animal Liberation
- Animal Rights

If the animal protection movement were understood as occupying a political continuum, with the most conservative values represented on the right and the most progressive values represented on the left, then the animal protection movement would look something

like this:



First let's consider the animal welfare worldview, which is the oldest, most conservative and most popular view held within the animal protection movement.

The animal welfare worldview can be summarised as being a belief that it is legitimate to use nonhuman animals as a human resource, so long as that use is 'necessary' and the suffering caused to the animal is 'minimised'.

In this country, the animal welfare philosophy is most strongly represented within the Australian RSPCA and the Animal Welfare League. It is people from these organisations who are most likely to sit on animal ethics committees. They would also be the most likely to view the use of animals in research as permissible, so long as all reasonable steps are made to protect the animals from unnecessary suffering.

It is organisations that espouse the Animal Welfare philosophy that the NSW Government has chosen to empower under the NSW *Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979*. Therefore, it could be said that animal welfarism is the philosophy that most closely represents government policy towards animals in NSW, and throughout Australia, today.

Earlier I said that the discrepancy, which exists between the moral philosophy of animal rights and the popular use of the term animal rights, was one of semantics. The reason for that is that people from the more progressive[1] end of the animal protection movement often use the term animal rights to describe their belief system because in their mind the term 'animal welfare' has been largely discredited. The reason they believe this to be the case is that there are many people in our society who claim to be concerned about animal welfare. People who farm egg-laying hens in battery cages often claim that the reason they are keeping hens in cages is out of concern for their welfare. And people who use animals in research may tell you that their biggest priority is the welfare of animals.

What this means is that almost everyone claims to be concerned about animal welfare. However, 'almost everyone' is a large group consisting of both those who inflict pain and suffering on animals and those who seek to protect animal from such treatment. This is the reason why those at the progressive end of animal protection movement viewing the term 'animal welfare' as largely discredited. As Francione notes:

the most ardent defenders of institutionalized animal exploitation themselves endorse animal welfare. Almost everyone – including those who use animals in painful experiments or who slaughter them for food – accepts as abstract propositions that animals ought to be treated 'humanely' and ought not to be subject to 'unnecessary suffering' (Francione 1996:1).

Therefore, in practical terms, when people choose to refer to themselves as animal rights advocates, it is often the case that they are trying to distinguish themselves from animal welfarists. Indeed many people who hold the view that the concept of animal welfare is not credible often argue that animal welfare is almost code for animal cruelty.

Now let's consider animal liberation. Most people who advocate animal rights in Australia are actually advocating a form of animal liberation. *Animal Liberation* was the name of a book first published in 1975. It was written by Australian philosopher Peter Singer (Singer 1995). Animal Liberation is also the name taken by the most popular progressive animal protection organisations in this country.

Singer's theory places a heavy burden on animal users to justify why it is morally acceptable to harm animals for human benefit, especially when that human benefit is often trivial. Respondents are required to demonstrate how many of the animal uses we take for granted can be morally justified, without relying on arguments which assume that humans are always superior to nonhuman animals simply by virtue of our species. People who advocate animal liberation are likely to oppose most, if not all, animal research.

Now to the most progressive animal protection position – animal rights. The animal rights position is largely abolitionist. In order to adhere to a strict animal rights

position advocates must oppose all modern industrial animal use[2]. This means that, politically, the animal rights position is very difficult to sustain and therefore not as popular a position as you might imagine.

The reason I say the animal rights position is difficult to sustain is that when people try to achieve change in the type of political system we live in – namely a liberal democratic political system – they normally try to do so via reform. This means that you try to achieve small incremental changes towards a bigger goal. But the notion of animal rights, which is largely abolitionist, does not always sit comfortably with the idea of reform. Indeed, some theorists have argued that by engaging in reform animal advocates are actually perpetuating the cruelty as opposed to helping end it.

People who subscribe to an animal rights position are unlikely to be willing to sit on an animal ethics committee. In fact those who subscribe to a strict animal rights philosophical position would find it very difficult to morally justify participating in an animal ethics committee, as they would be likely to believe that they are supporting a system designed to allow animal cruelty, as opposed to actually alleviating the problem.

John Hadley has described what the actual philosophical animal rights position is. He explained why some ethicists believe it is morally wrong to use animals in research. I have also discussed the different philosophies which make up the animal protection movement and I have argued that while use of the term 'animal rights' is a very popular term used to express a strong opposition to many common animal uses, activists who espouse animal rights are more likely to actually support a more moderate position, such as the animal liberation worldview.

Finally, I would like to outline some of the reasons why those who strongly oppose the use of animals in research may believe such use is morally wrong, even if they do not subscribe to the animal rights philosophy in the strictest sense. I will do this with specific reference to the political situation in NSW. I think this is a useful exercise because I am sure there are some people in the audience who have been thinking to themselves 'but what we are doing is legal and it is overseen by an animal ethics committee so how can anyone object?' But, as we will see, there are very real political objections to the use of animals in research that take us beyond philosophical issues and into the realm of power relations.

The first objection may be that the NSW Animal Research Review Panel[3], the body that oversees the system of enforced self regulation we have in NSW and which advises the relevant Minister on issues pertaining to scientific animal use, is constituted in such a way that animal researchers are most strongly represented. As only four out of the Panel's twelve members are nominated by the animal protection movement, and of them two are drawn from the more conservative NSW RSPCA, it may therefore be argued that the Panel does not give adequate weight to the views held by those who oppose animal research.

Furthermore, those who sit on the Animal Research Review Panel and on animal ethics committees are bound by strict confidentiality, meaning that even if there were a problem, that problem could not be brought to the attention of the general public. This means that animals used in research and education are not afforded the protection which may flow from 'the court of public opinion'. Don't forget that animal researchers tend to be secretive and so the progressive end of the animal protection movement is effectively shut out of the approval process. That practice of shutting the animal protection movement out of the process, by denying them access to information, has, as I am sure you can imagine, resulted in mistrust and suspicion[4]. In support of the claim that activists mistrust animal researchers I wish to draw the audience's attention to the significant time and energy activists spend on illegally entering research facilities in order to document conditions. Influential British anti-vivisection organisation, The British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV) states on their web site:

The animal research industry is responsible for the deliberate infliction of pain, suffering, distress and death on billions of animals every year around the world. By its very nature, it is an industry that remains closed to public scrutiny. It operates behind closed doors and in secrecy. The BUAV, in its determination to break through this secrecy, not only pioneered the use of investigative work in the UK but also, at an international level, leads the field with its expertise to expose the plight of laboratory animals (BUAV 2005).

I think it is fair to conclude that activists would not consider 'under cover' work necessary if they trusted animal researchers to provide them with adequate and accurate information.

Along the same lines, those who oppose the use of animals in research may also argue that animal ethics committees are stacked against the animals and in favour of the research. They may argue that a Category C person (that is, the animal welfare representative) is unlikely to effectively make their voice heard for three reasons. First, they are often outnumbered; secondly, they may not be confident to speak up when in conference with doctors and professors, and finally, they are unlikely to have the scientific ability to understand the detail of the protocol before them and come up with an effective counter argument. Furthermore, animal rights activists are likely to argue that Category C people, by their very nature, are likely to be reformist or welfarist and therefore not strong advocates for animals anyway.

Activists may also object to the structure of the NSW *Animal Research Act* 1985 and the *Australian Code of Practice for the Care and Use of Animal for Scientific Purposes*. They may argue that neither document facilitates ethical reflection and assumes from the very start that animal research is necessary. Similarly, they may also argue that neither the Code nor the Act actively encourages researchers to seek alternatives. Furthermore, they may argue that the section in the protocols, which asks researchers if there is any alternative available, is in fact little more than a rubber stamp.

Another common objection expressed by activists to the use of animals in research is that animal researchers overstate the benefits of their research, often to secure funding, and that most animal research, especially at honours and post graduate level, is unlikely to produce results of any significance to human health and wellbeing.

I hope my talk has brought some clarity to the politics of animal protection.

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(Footnotes)

* This paper was originally written as a lecture given as part of the University of Sydney's induction course for new animal research students. I would like to thank Malcolm France for inviting me to speak. I would also like to thank John Hadley, Len Cantrill and Julie Carlill for their ideas and feedback. Finally, I would like to thank the editors of the *ANCCART News* for publishing this article and for their helpful editorial comments.

[1] The word 'progressive' is used here in the political sense to differentiate groups with a (more) radical agenda from those with a (more) conservative worldview.

[2] It may be possible to identify some limited exceptions to the abolitionist principle. However, it is unlikely the use of animals in research could be adequately justified according to a strict animal rights philosophical model.

[3] I have been a member of the NSW Animal Research Review Panel since 2003. The view I express here will no doubt be controversial and may not be shared by all my colleagues on the Panel.

[4] This view was particularly controversial when the lecture was first presented. Some animal researchers in the audience were of the opinion that the reason animal researchers are secretive is they are scared of animal rights activists and a number of researchers also expressed offense at the statement. The point, however, remains. Regardless of whether researchers are in actual fact secretive or not, or the reasons why they may be so, the perception within the animal protection movement is that animal researchers are actively trying to withhold information.

So what exactly is "Animal Rights"?

Malcolm France
Director of Laboratory Animal Services,
University of Sydney

Luckily, I don't have to answer this question by myself. Last year, I learnt of a group called 'Animal Issues Sydney'. Founded by Sydney academics John Hadley and Siobhan O'Sullivan, this is a discussion group that meets fortnightly to debate published articles relevant to Animal Rights. I was delighted to be welcomed into the group and although the discussions are often challenging, the atmosphere is consistently one of open-mindedness and informed comment.

More recently, John and Siobhan kindly agreed to give presentations at an introductory course for new researchers held twice yearly at the University of Sydney. Among other things, this course aims to provide participants with a grounding in the key ethical and regulatory issues relating to animal research. John's and Siobhan's input, I believe, has added a valuable dimension to the course, not only by ensuring that Animal Rights views are fairly represented but also by doing so in a lucid and accessible manner.

Thanks to the ANZCCART News, the text of their presentations is now being presented to a wider audience. It should be stressed that neither is intended to constitute a scholarly review. Instead, their aim is to inform newcomers and generate some thoughtful discussion.

To me, a crucial feature of both presentations is that they make no reference to the scientific validity or otherwise of animal research. Perhaps they don't need to. In its pure form, Animal Rights is a philosophical position based on simple logic: when humans do things to sentient animals that they wouldn't do to each other, they are being discriminatory (or 'speciesist') and this is morally wrong regardless of what other benefits there might be. Armed with such logic, the Animal Rights advocate does not need to seek flaws in the science when arguing their case against animal research.

In fact, far from attempting to refute the science, some Animal Rights proponents readily accept that animal research has delivered benefits. This is implied in John's presentation and is also a critical but rarely-mentioned point made by Peter Singer in 'Animal Liberation'. (Singer says, for example, "No doubt there have been some advances in knowledge which would not have been attained as easily without using animals". [1]) This therefore poses a formidable challenge: are we prepared to sacrifice the benefits of animal research on the basis of a moral obligation to other animal species?

John goes on to argue the case for Animal Rights using a clear sequence of premises. By way of illustration, he employs a number of metaphors and hypothetical cases. In my experience, the use of such devices is common in discussions relating to animal ethics. Striking as these devices are, however, I can't help feeling that they are often a little contrived. How much weight should we really give, for example, to an artificial concept such as an intelligent alien?

Far more thought-provoking for me than a hypothetical argument is John's discussion of experiments conducted on non-consenting humans. This is confronting not only because the experiments really took place but also, I am convinced, because they involved our fellow humans. Would the impact have been as great had they involved animals? I believe not and although this is probably a speciesist view, it feels so fundamental that I doubt it would be susceptible to intellectual reasoning. I am therefore left wondering if speciesism is simply hard-wired into us.

John's talk on the principles of Animal Rights is complemented by Siobhan's talk addressing the practice of Animal Rights. Although less analytical, Siobhan is frank and pragmatic, particularly when distinguishing between the academic and the popular concepts of Animal Rights.

To me, a particularly important aspect of Siobhan's talk is the insight it provides into the way animal research is perceived by at least some in the broader community. Take, for example, the perception that animal research is a secretive business. The confidentiality obligations to which Siobhan refers (and which she claims are shutting out the animal protection movement) are of course simply designed to protect the intellectual property of

researchers. In some cases their implementation is perhaps bolstered by security concerns although this is not the primary intent. I suspect that many scientists would be surprised to learn that their activities are perceived as being secretive, particularly when they strive so hard to get their findings published (along with their names) in the public domain. Nevertheless, the 'secretive' claim is not uncommon.

As an aside, I believe that credit is due to ANZCCART for attempting to address this worrying perception. Attendance at ANZCCART conferences is open to all, regardless of their point of view, and many will recall that the 2003 conference was actually entitled 'Lifting the Veil.' Furthermore, in 2004 – thanks partly to support from a number of institutions, which notably have an interest in research – several fully funded conference places were made available to lay persons.

Siobhan suggests that those who actually attend Animal Rights protests are not motivated so much by philosophy as by a more fundamental opposition to the manner in which animals are treated. It is therefore important to consider what factors shape the perceptions that underlie this opposition. In addition to John and Siobhan's presentations, this year's course included a video produced by an Animal Rights organisation. I found myself having to agree with one student who described it as "a gross misrepresentation" of animal research. If we look once again at Singer's 'Animal Liberation', we see a heavy emphasis on military experiments, citation of outdated literature and even a study involving elephants dosed with LSD! None of this bears the slightest resemblance to any research I have encountered. It would be a cause of great concern if such representations formed the basis of public perception and hence opposition to animal research.

One final perception alluded to here is that Animal Ethics Committees and similar bodies are "stacked" with researchers. Based on the statutory composition of such bodies and on my own experience, I don't believe that this is true. Nevertheless, it is a perception that clearly exists and I am grateful to John and Siobhan for their willingness to participate in this sort of dialogue and help us see how others sometimes view animal research.

Unfortunately, the scientific questions that researchers are attempting to answer through the use of animals are complex ones – surely if they were simple, then answers would have been found long ago. I believe that the same can be said of the complex ethical questions associated with such research. John's and Siobhan's talks should serve to remind us all just how complex this field is. As I like say to students at the conclusion of our course, in all of this there is really only one simple message – and that is "Beware of simple messages!"

References

1 Singer, P (2002) Tools for Research in 'Animal Liberation', 2nd edition, Harper Collins (this edition contains a new preface but the text is that of the revised edition published in 1990).

Editorial

A plea for research scientists to become more closely involved with animal ethics issues.

In Australia, the laws governing the wellbeing of animals used for research differ from one State or Territory to another. Nevertheless, properly constituted Animal Ethics Committees (AECs) must approve research projects that involve the use of animals, before such projects can legally commence. While AECs have a degree of autonomy in the processes they follow, they rely to a significant extent on the "Australian code of practice for the care and use of animals for scientific purposes" (7th Edition, NHMRC), henceforth referred to as "the Code". The Code represents a common theme that underpins legislation and AEC operation. Before approving or rejecting individual projects, AEC members must undertake the "almost impossible" task of balancing the potential benefits to be gained from the research, against the welfare and ethical "costs" associated with animal use.

Although it is not difficult to find animal welfarists, research scientists and others who are critical of various components of the AEC approval process and/or the Code; taken overall the system appears to work reasonably well, and there can be little doubt that the

general standard of care applied to research animals in Australia has greatly improved over the last twenty years.

The complex interface between, on the one hand scientists who use animals in their research, and on the other individuals and organisations that oppose such use of animals, has not been characterised in Australia by the unyielding attitudes and confrontations that have occurred periodically in other countries. No doubt there are many reasons for this state of affairs, but the two that stand out are:

- the broad consultative process involved in developing and revising the Code; and
- the establishment of ANZCCART, an organisation that addresses in a balanced and considered way, the distinctive scientific, ethical and social issues associated with the use of animals for scientific purposes and teaching.

Typifying ANZCCART's activities was the 2004 annual conference held in Sydney entitled "Animal Ethics: New Frontiers, New Opportunities". The conference attracted 195 delegates - a record attendance for an ANZCCART function of this type. Amongst the invited Australian and overseas speakers were animal welfarists, veterinarians, AEC chairpersons, lawyers, bioethicists and scientists. ANZCCART conferences are gaining a reputation as venues for fostering open and respectful discussion between delegates who may hold differing viewpoints on a wide range of animal use-related topics. This dialogue contributes to an environment where these differing views and opinions are understood and respected.

During my tenure as ANZCCART Director, I have detected what could be referred to as an "imbalance" in the contributions made by various sectors of the community, to the discussions and debates on the use of animals for research. Ethicists and animal welfarists have been efficient and effective in making their views widely known. In contrast, members of the scientific community who use animals for research have proved somewhat reticent to participate in discussions, workshops and conferences that address animal ethics issues. As a generalisation, it would appear that research scientists feel ill-at-ease in discussing those aspects of their research that make use of animals, even in cases where such research has undoubted medical benefits.

As an example, the scientists I have spoken with have expressed severe reservations about the suggestion (see *Letter to the Editor* from Prof. Graham Nerlich, ANZCCART NEWS 17.1 and 17.3, 2004) that the AEC approval processes should become more "transparent" to members of the public. One can, perhaps, understand the need for commercial confidentiality in some cases. However, even if we accept Cicero's dictum: *The safety of the public is the supreme law - not the people's need to be informed*, it is difficult to substantiate a "safety" argument, given the history of interface between scientists and animal welfarists in Australia.

Whatever the *pros* and *cons* associated with contentious issues such as AEC transparency, one thing is abundantly clear – research scientists in Australia should make a strong and continuing effort to become more closely involved in animal ethics debates. Without such involvement, the ways in which the use of animals in research are regulated and monitored risk becoming disconnected from the genuine benefits derived by the community from the use of animals in research.

Support to ANZCCART from the University of Adelaide

ANZCCART, as its name implies, is an Australian and New Zealand organisation, and presently our Australia office is located on the city campus of the University of Adelaide, in the Mitchell Building.

As the "host institution", the University of Adelaide provides a considerable level of "in kind" support to ANZCCART in the form of services and facilities. These include: office accommodation and cleaning, power and lighting, information technology support, and payroll & financial services.

ANZCCART gratefully acknowledges the support provided by the University of Adelaide.

Letters to the Editor

With reference to your article in the latest ANZCCART NEWS "How humane is induction ...." by Leach and Morton, which shows that CO_2 caused the greatest degree of irritation to rodents (as measured by aversive reaction). CO_2 is a volatile acid in equilibrium with carbonic acid. CO_2 introduced into the airways reacts with water in the mucosal secretions to form carbonic acid (H_2CO_3). Carbonic acid like all acids is extremely irritating. Low levels of CO_2 are intolerable to human beings and un-anaesthetised animals. The findings of Leach and Morton emphasise that this simple chemical relationship between CO_2 and carbonic acid causes pain.

Eugenie R Lumbers

BOOK REVIEW

"The Welfare of Laboratory Animals" Edited by Eila Kaliste. Series Editor Clive Phillips. Klewer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/ London. 358 pages.

Reviewed by Denise Noonan, Animal Welfare Officer and Clinical Veterinarian, Monash University.

Contents:

1. Animal welfare- an introduction;
2. Research, ethics and animal welfare. Regulations, alternatives and guidelines;
3. Infections in laboratory animals: Importance and control;
4. Housing, care and environmental factors;
5. Nutrition and animal welfare;
6. Experimental procedures: General principles and recommendations;
7. The welfare of laboratory mice;
8. The welfare of laboratory rats;
9. The welfare of laboratory guinea pigs;
10. The welfare of laboratory rabbits;
11. The welfare of laboratory dogs;
12. The welfare of laboratory pigs and minipigs;
13. The welfare of non-human primates;
14. Animal welfare issues under laboratory constraints, an ethological perspective: rodents and marmosets;

The Welfare of Laboratory Animals is one of the books in the *Animal Welfare by Species* Series. The fundamental ethos of this Series is that humans have a moral obligation to ensure the welfare of animals and to meet animals' species-specific needs. *The Welfare of Laboratory Animals* details key animal welfare aspects of Laboratory Animal maintenance and use and concentrates particularly on the requirements for nutrition, behaviour, reproduction and the physical and social environment of mice, rats, guinea pigs, rabbits, dogs, pigs and non-human primates. The intended audience comprises students, lecturers, research investigators and providers of laboratory animal care, however the information would also be of interest to members of Animal Ethics Committees and others concerned with the welfare of these animals.

The Welfare of Laboratory Animals has international relevance, although it is written mainly for a European audience. The authors are leading European laboratory animal specialists with expertise in animal welfare, and include Vera Baumans, Robert Hubrecht, David Morton, Timo Nevalainen, Werner Nicklas, and Merel Ritskes-Hoitinga. Many of the 25 authors have contributed to publications of the Federation of European Laboratory Animal Science Associations (FELASA), and this is reflected in the frequent citation of many excellent FELASA publications throughout the text. There are also references to key USA publications, principally with regard to harmonization, regulatory issues and comparative housing standards. Government regulation of scientific use of laboratory animals in Australia and New Zealand reflects a combination of the USA and European approaches.

Intended as an overview and summary of animal welfare principles for each of the species, rather than a detailed "stand alone" textbook, this book could be used as part of the reading requirements for a training course for research investigators and students. In this situation additional documentary resources such as the relevant legislation, Codes of Practice, euthanasia and animal procedure guidelines would be needed for Australian and New Zealand readers. Alternately, the reader can use

each chapter as a summary, and then use the reference list at the end of the chapter to further their study.

The book comprises two parts; the first focuses on general principles of laboratory animal maintenance and experimental use including principles of good science. The second part gives a comprehensive description of the welfare questions considered important for each of the selected laboratory animal species. Extensive reference to European and USA examples of legislative requirements and guidelines for the welfare, housing and care of laboratory animals are made throughout the book.

The presentation of information within the book varies with chapter author, and subject. With 25 authors, the book reflects the challenge of achieving consistency of approach throughout the document, particularly in the species specific chapters of part 2. Cross referencing between the chapters in part 1 and those of part 2 could have been used to better illustrate points made in the general sense in part 1. For example, when discussing government regulation of animal housing in chapter 2, reference is made to the Council of Europe Convention ETS 123 Appendix A. Tables extracted from Appendix A are published in chapters 4, 7, 8 and 10 without cross referencing that would have assisted the reader. The book would also have been improved by provision of a glossary of animal welfare and animal husbandry terminology.

Although mainly text, the use of photographs, diagrams and tables of important guidelines helps explain and summarise some of the material for the reader. Interesting features of the species-specific chapters are the examples of ethograms (time-related activity and behaviour patterns) which have been included. Each chapter contains a reference list which includes some authoritative publications or suggestions for further reading. The majority of these are European publications. Australian and New Zealand readers will need to augment the information supplied by the book with local regulatory requirements and Codes of Practice for animal welfare, production, housing and use.

Comments on the contents.

Part 1: General principles for the maintenance and use of laboratory animals (Chapters 1-6).

- The introductory chapter on animal welfare sets the underlying ethical and moral tone of the book- humans have an obligation to attend to the welfare of animals. It then goes on to briefly state some philosophical views and the difficulties in viewing welfare from either a purely measurable, scientific and pragmatic perspective (involving good biological functioning and the possibility of performing natural behaviours), or from a purely subjective values-based "preferences and feelings" perspective. A "middle ground" solution is suggested.

- Chapter 2: Regulation of animal-based research. The author starts with the premise that the community demands high quality biomedical research and accepts animal use overall in science, and this is reflected in legislation which permits the scientific use of animals. However, the community insists animal use be humane, resulting in European Commission legal requirements for European Union Member States to promote Reduction, Refinement or Replacement of the use of laboratory animals (3Rs). Cost-benefit analysis for ethical evaluation of individual animal studies, and increasing emphasis on animal welfare aspects of facilities and procedures is discussed. Education and training for all involved with the scientific use of animals is emphasised, and clearly this book is intended to help meet this educational goal. Harmonisation (standardisation) of the laws and regulations on use of vertebrate animals in research is the main aim of the European Directive and the Convention (86/609/EEC, ETS123). The revision of animal housing and care requirements (Appendix A) is discussed in general terms. It would have been relevant for the author to summarise or reprint extracts from Appendix A, and cross reference to those extracts included in species-specific chapters such as the mouse, rat and rabbit. However, imminent changes to Appendix A are anticipated by the chapter author, and this may be why details of current standards have not been included.

- The chapter titled *Infections in laboratory animals: importance and control* briefly states

key facts concerning the impact of infections on experimental results, how infections can be prevented, the importance of monitoring animal health, and lists a number of references and reviews as support. It would have helped the reader if there could have been summary tables, or reprints of some tables and lists from some of these references, particularly those for which the chapter author is author or co-author. Laboratory animal specialists would already be aware of these publications, however the less knowledgeable reader is set a long shopping list. A glossary of terms such as SPF, gnotobiotic and barrier reared would have been a helpful reference.

- Chapter 4: *Housing, care and environmental factors*. The authors provide a comprehensive and concise summary of the topic, with frequent use of photographs and tables to illustrate the text and provide additional detail and examples. The authors briefly explain and contrast the European legislative approach which enshrine minimum housing standards with the USA/Canadian approach which more self-regulation and guidelines-based.

- *Nutrition and animal welfare*. The authors provide a good general overview, and also provide additional detail on the biology of feeding behaviour, circadian rhythms, scientific manipulations of feeding, and feeding behaviour for psychological and pharmacological research purposes. The emphasis on feeding behaviour reflects the scientific interests of the authors, and although the information is relevant to the topic, is one example of the variability in style and emphasis between different chapters in this book.

- *Experimental procedures: General principles and recommendations*. This chapter (24 pages) provides an excellent key point summary covering animal handling, administration of substances, blood collection, anaesthesia, analgesia and euthanasia. The inclusion of "good practice" tips was an ideal approach, and I would have preferred to see the level of detail presented in this chapter applied consistently throughout the book. Inclusion of more photographs and line drawings, and better cross referencing between the text and major references (such as Euthanasia references) would have increased its value for teaching purposes.

Part 2: The welfare of different species (Chapters 7-14).

The second part of the book presented species-specific information on a range of common laboratory animal species. The chapters for the mouse and rat were the most thorough and detailed, covering the topics: biology & behavioural needs, optimal environment, housing, feeding and care, health and disease problems, common experimental techniques, assessment of well-being. The reader would find the chapter on the mouse a good starting point before proceeding to the other species chapters. The approach by each chapter author was quite variable, so greater emphasis is placed on the process of domestication, the behaviour of wild ancestors, or the refinement of commonly performed scientific procedures in some chapters more than others.

In conclusion, this book would be an excellent teaching resource for a laboratory animal training course for students and research investigators. The student or reader with limited knowledge or experience of the biology, husbandry or welfare of these species will obtain most value from the comprehensive overviews provided. Laboratory animal specialists and Animal Ethics Committee members will find that this book has value as a reference which concisely summarises the main animal welfare principles most applicable to the common laboratory animal species.

NEWS & VIEWS

NEWS FROM ANZCCART: RETIREMENT OF DIRECTOR

After three years as Director of ANZCCART, Dr. Rory Hope has formally decided to retire. In commenting on Rory's retirement, Professor Julie Owens (Chair of the ANZCCART Board) said "On behalf of the Board, I would very much like to thank Rory for his sustained and outstanding contributions as Director over the past years".

The position of Director has been advertised, and it is hoped to have a new person at the helm soon. In the meantime, Rory has agreed to stay on to assist with the transition process.

NATIONAL ANIMAL WELFARE ADVISORY COMMITTEE APPOINTMENT

The Associate Minister of Agriculture (Hon Damien O'Connor) has appointed Dr Peter O'Hara to succeed David Mellor as chairman of the National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC). The appointment comes into effect on 1 November 2005 and is for a one-year term.

Dr O'Hara, a retired veterinarian, is a former Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. He is now a part-time consultant.

NATIONAL ANIMAL ETHICS ADVISORY COMMITTEE APPOINTMENT

The Associate Minister of Agriculture (Hon Damien O'Connor) has appointed Mr John Martin to succeed Wyn Hoadley as chairman of the National Animal Ethics Advisory Committee (NAEAC). The appointment comes into effect on 1 November 2005 and is for a one-year term.

John has recently retired from Victoria University of Wellington where he taught undergraduate, post-graduate and post-experience courses in public administration. He remains a Senior Associate at the University and a Teaching Fellow in the School of Government and continues to be engaged in the supervision of post-graduate students. He is also an Honorary Fellow at the University of Otago (Wellington School of Medicine).

John was the Chair of ANZCCART, a sub-committee of the Royal Society of New Zealand, for a four-year period until the end of 2003.

5TH WORLD CONGRESS ON ALTERNATIVES AND ANIMAL USE IN THE LIFE SCIENCES

Berlin, Germany, August 21-25, 2005

The deadline for submitting abstracts is now past, but to register for the conference please visit the website: http://www.ctw-congress.de/act2005/

THE JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW AND ETHICS

This journal has recently been approved as an unofficial journal at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, to be run by students with the support of a faculty advisory board. JALE seeks to provide a scholarly forum for cross-disciplinary engagement of issues of animal law and ethics. Editors of the Journal are currently seeking submissions for the first issue. Submissions may touch upon any topic that is related to the field of animal law or ethics. For further information, please contact: Matthew Olesh at molesh@law.upenn.edu

JOURNAL OF ANIMAL WELFARE

Although the deadline for submission of papers has now passed, readers will be interested to learn that the journal *Animal Welfare* (ISSN 0962-7286) plans to publish a special issue on the topic: "Recent developments in the 3Rs"

The concept of the 3Rs was developed by the eminent scientists William Russell and Rex Burch almost 50 years ago. The special issue will focus on recent developments in the 3Rs in science and teaching in the medical, veterinary, biological, conservation and related fields.

For further information:
http://www.ufaw.org.uk/index.htm

BOOK REPORT FROM THE INSTITUTE OF LABORATORY ANIMAL RESEARCH (ILAR)

SCIENCE, MEDICINE AND ANIMALS (2004)

Diseases cause a staggering amount of suffering and death in both people and animals. As a result, human society has committed itself to alleviating this suffering. Toward this goal, biomedical research has included the use of animals as one component of research to understand, treat, and cure many human and animal diseases. Animals develop many of the same diseases as people, including hemophilia, diabetes, and epilepsy. Animals and humans are also susceptible to many of the same bacteria and viruses, such as anthrax, smallpox, and malaria. Because animals share so many health risks and issues with humans, they can be useful models for understanding illness and how to treat it.

Science, Medicine, and Animals discusses how animals have been and continue to be an important component of biomedical research. It addresses the history of animal research and what it looks like today, and gives an overview of some of the medical advances that would not have been possible without animal models. Finally, it looks at the regulations and oversight governing animal use, as well as efforts to use animals more humanely and efficiently.

From: http://dels.nas.edu/ilar/recentpubs.asp?id=recentpubs)
This publication can be read free, on line, at:
http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10733.html

PHYSICIANS COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIBLE MEDICINE

Cynthia Burnett (*Animal Australia*) has drawn our attention to an article by Balcombe JP, Barnard ND, and Sandusky C that appeared in the journal *Contemporary Topics in Laboratory Animal Science* (2004 Vol 43 No. 6, pages 42-51). The authors are from the *Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine*, based in Washington, DC, USA. An abstract of the article appears below:

Eighty published studies were appraised to document the potential stress associated with three routine laboratory procedures commonly performed on animals: handling, blood collection, and orogastric gavage. We defined handling as any non-invasive manipulation occurring as part of routine husbandry, including lifting an animal and cleaning or moving an animal's cage. Significant changes in physiologic parameters correlated with stress (e.g., serum or plasma concentrations of corticosterone, glucose, growth hormone or prolactin, heart rate, blood pressure, and behavior) were associated with all three procedures in multiple species in the studies we examined. The results of these studies demonstrated that animals responded with rapid, pronounced, and statistically significant elevations in stress-related responses for each of the procedures, although handling elicited variable alterations in immune system responses. Changes from baseline or control measures typically ranged from 20% to 100% or more and lasted at least 30 min or longer. We interpret these findings to indicate that laboratory routines are associated with stress, and that animals do not readily habituate to them. The data suggest that significant fear, stress, and possibly distress are predictable consequences of routine laboratory procedures, and that these phenomena have substantial scientific and humane implications for the use of animals in laboratory research.

ANZSLAS/AATA CONFERENCE 2005

The conference will be held from 27th - 29th September at the Esplanade Hotel, Fremantle, Western Australia.

- Conference themes include:
- Health and pathology of mouse models for human diseases
- Production of GM animals
- Immunodeficient models
- Databases and bioinformatics
- Sheep as a lab animal
- Management of endangered species
- Phenotyping mouse models
- Latest issues relating to SPF facility management

For further information see the website: http://www.anzslas.org/conference.htm

SINGAPORE ADOPTS NATIONAL GUIDELINES ON ANIMAL RESEARCH

As of November 15, 2004, research institutions in Singapore are required to follow new guidelines on the use and care of research animals. The guidelines are meant to improve and standardize the treatment of research animals within Singapore, where previously, research institutions followed their own standards for the use of research animals. The new guidelines were developed by the Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority (AVA) in conjunction with many groups including research and educational institutes and animal protection organizations. They were modelled after regulations existing in the United States, Australia, and Canada. Violations of the new guidelines could result in up to a year in prison and fines of 10,000 Singapore dollars (5,900 US).

With the new regulations in effect, research institutions seeking approval to begin animal research will first have to pass AVA inspections to ensure they conform to the animal use guidelines. Existing institutions will have up to 18 months to fully comply and must create an Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee responsible for maintaining adherence to the new regulations. Training on the proper care, handling, and housing of lab animals will also be required for all staff and animal handlers within research institutions.

Source: The Humane Society of the United States http://www.hsus.org/

RSPCA AUSTRALIA SCHOLARSHIPS FOR ANIMAL WELFARE RESEARCH 2005-2006

Each year since 1989, RSPCA Australia has offered the RSPCA Australia Alan White Scholarship to full-time or part-time students for the funding of original research aimed at improving the welfare of animals in Australia. In 2004, the RSPCA expanded its scholarship program and now offers two types of scholarships, one for research into general animal welfare issues, and another for specific projects aimed at improving the welfare of livestock in intensive production systems. The RSPCA Australia scholarships are intended to encourage students to take an active interest in animal welfare issues, to support animal welfare research that might not otherwise attract funding, and to promote the objectives of the RSPCA within the research community.

Details can be found at the following website: http://www.rspca.org.au/

CANADIAN COUNCIL ON ANIMAL CARE (CCAC)

CCAC is the national organisation responsible for setting and maintaining standards for the care and use of animals in research, teaching and testing throughout Canada.

The CACC website contains some interesting statistics on the use of animals for scientific purposes. The number of mice used trended down from 1981 to 1997, but has since been increasing. Data are given for a number of additional species. Full details can be found at: http://www.ccac.ca/en/CCAC_Main.htm

2nd InterNICHE Conference Alternatives in the Mainstream: Innovations in Life Science education and Training

The conference focused on alternatives in education and related issues. The event received positive feedback from both speakers and delegates. A major outcome from the conference was the strong support for full replacement of harmful animal use in education.

The first of the conference sound files has now been launched on the InterNICHE website. To listen to the conference, visit www.interniche.org/conf2005.html

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BREAKING NEWS

ANZCCART APPOINTS NEW DIRECTOR

Professor Julie Owens, Chair of the ANZCCART Board, has announced that Dr Geoffrey Dandie has been offered the position of Director of ANZCCART and has accepted.

Dr. Dandie attended the recent ANZCCART Annual General Meeting as an observer, and will be taking up the full time position in the very near future.

Dr Dandie is a researcher with a long-standing interest in cell biology and immunology, and has lead research groups at the University of Tasmania and more recently at the Child Health Research Institute, Adelaide. He also has extensive experience in administration and management in a range of organisations and in conference organisation and publication.

Importantly, Dr Dandie has experience of and participation in animal ethics committees, the education and training of students and staff in the care of animals in research and teaching and related ethics issues.

In welcoming Dr. Dandie to the position, Professor Owens said, “I believe we can look forward to a highly productive and effective partnership between the Council, Board and the new Director of ANZCCART”.

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